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Abstract - Rebranding corresponds to the creation of a new 
name, term, symbol, design or a combination of them for 
an established brand with the intention of developing a 
differentiated position in the mind of stakeholders and 
competitors. Increased competition has led firms to an 
avenue of differentiation, and rebranding has been 
approached by firms in order to differentiate themselves 
and to promote the corporate image. Corporate 
rebranding, although commonly referred in the press, has 
received little attention from academia. This paper tends 
to contribute to fill this gap in the academic literature, by 
analysing the impact that corporate image through 
rebranding has on the firms’ stock market value, using 
event study methodologies. We focus on firms listed on the 
Lisbon Stock Market in the period 2000 – February 2009. 
We do not find evidence of a positive impact of corporate 
rebranding on firm value, in Portuguese firms. In fact, our 
results suggest that these events may have a negative 
impact on firm value, even though our empirical evidence 
is weak, in supporting this conclusion.
*
 




Increasing global competition has led firms toward 
an even higher need for distinctiveness. When looking 
at the variables that are most qualified to sustain a 
competitive advantage, the corporate image emerges 
(Kay, 2006). Adopting the definition proposed by 
Muzellec and Lambkin (2006), rebranding corresponds 
to the creation of a new brand element aiming to create 
a new image or position in the mind of stakeholders. A 
good and strong corporate image can have a positive 
impact on workers, managers, investors, and customers‟ 
evaluations. On the other hand, rebranding is a strategy 
involving considerable risks, as strong brands take years 
to be successfully built in order to provide higher 
margins, loyal customer bases and a continuous stream 
of income for the firm representing the brand (Aaker, 
1996; Keller, 2002).  
As corporate rebranding decisions aim to add value 
to the firm, by sending a positive sign to stakeholders, 
the success and economical rationale of these decisions 
may be judged by identifying its impact on firm value, 
i.e., the impact on the firm‟s stock price. In fact, the 
                                                 
 
market value of a firm‟s traded securities reflects an 
unbiased estimate of future cash flows (Simon and 
Sullivan, 1993). A corporate rebranding signals the 
market that something in the firm has changed, 
hopefully implying a more positive outlook. 
In evaluating the impact of these types of events, 
we use event study methodologies, which have been 
previously applied extensively in different fields of 
economic, finance and management studies. Under the 
assumption that markets are efficient, the impact of 
corporate branding decisions on stock prices should 
occur on the day of the announcement, or in the next 
day, if the market is already closed when the news is 
disclosed. Therefore, event study methodologies try to 
detect abnormal returns in stock prices on and around 
the event day. Evidence of the effect that corporate 
rebranding decisions have on firm value is relevant both 
for the firm‟s managers and for investors. 
In this paper, we apply event study methodology to 
Portuguese firms, to analyze the impact of corporate 
rebranding on their market value, thus adding both to 
the empirical evidence on this type of event and to the 
understanding on smaller capital markets. To the best of 
our knowledge, there are no previous studies covering 
the impact of rebranding actions in the Portuguese stock 
market.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. 
In section 2, we present some of the more relevant 
previous studies on corporate rebranding, including 
studies that analyse empirically its impact on firm value. 
Section 3 presents the data and section 4 presents the 
event study methodologies and statistical tests applied 
to the data. In section 5 we present the empirical results. 
Finally, in section 6, we present the conclusions. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Corporate Rebranding 
A brand is usually defined as „a name, term, 
symbol, design or a combination of them intended to 
identify goods or services of one seller or group of 
sellers and to differentiate them from those of 
competitors‟ (Kotler, 2008). Brands are increasingly 
viewed as one of the major assets firms possess. Tadelis 
(1999) defined a firm‟s reputation (and its associated 
name) as a valuable intangible asset. Brands 
differentiate, protect and convey meaning to what firms 
communicate to customers. Competition increases the 
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power of brands, as these allow non-price differentiation 
(Aaker, 1991). Brand names are somewhat different 
than corporate brand names and corporate brands are 
more than just trade names (see Muzellec, 2006 for a 
review on the subject). Following Einwiller and Will 
(2002, p.101), corporate branding is considered a 
„systematically planned and implemented process of 
creating and maintaining a favourable image and 
consequently a favourable reputation of the firm as a 
whole by sending signals to all stakeholders by 
managing behaviour, communication and symbolism‟. 
Kay (2006) adds that corporate branding is the way an 
organization communicates its identity. As product 
brands, corporate brands are designed to evoke positive 
associations from stakeholders (Dacin and Brown, 
2002). Corporate brands are said to be more central and 
strategic, controlled by top management (Hatch and 
Schultz, 2003), more abstract, representing higher-order 
values (de Chernatony, 2002) and more complex, with 
possible different meanings for different stakeholders 
(Balmer and Greyser, 2002), when compared to product 
brands. 
The issue of corporate branding has been 
adequately discussed in the literature, but corporate 
rebranding has been somehow neglected from academic 
research, despite firms‟ evidence of such moves. Most 
of the existing research on corporate rebranding focuses 
on revolutionary rebranding, such as the creation of a 
new name (Horsky and Swyngedouw, 1987; Delattre, 
2002; Muzellec and Lambkin, 2006; Muzellec, 2006). 
In this paper, we approach all the continuum of 
rebranding, trying to include minor and major changes 
to corporate branding. 
A good and strong corporate image influences 
current workers (Riordan et al., 1997), investors 
(Fombrun and Shanley, 1990), future applicants 
(Dowling, 1988) and customers‟ evaluations and 
preferences (Bravo et al., 2009; Howcroft, 1991). That 
is to say that managing a strong corporate brand is 
different than managing strong product brands: 
corporate brands are communicated to different 
stakeholders and may have lesser impact on consumers 
(Kay, 2006). A well conceived, solid, strong corporate 
branding strategy provides management with a holistic 
framework to integrate the firm‟s activities, its vision 
and mission; it allows the firm to express its 
distinctiveness, that is, to differentiate itself in the 
relationship with stakeholders (Schultz and de 
Chernatony, 2002), and represents an opportunity to 
increase the future incomes of the firm. 
Sometimes, despite the high budgets spent on 
communicating the corporate positioning, firms fail to 
create a distinctive image and have to rebrand (Bravo et 
al., 2009). The reasons to rebrand can come from 
changing external conditions, weaker competitive 
position, changing ownerships structures and/or changes 
in corporate strategy (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Muzellec and Lambkin, 2006). Delattre (2002) finds 
four categories of reasons to rebrand: new corporate 
image, new management or shareholding structure, new 
activity, and change of legal status. Despite the 
motivation and the investment involved, rebranding has 
its risks: part of existing accumulated goodwill, in the 
form of name recognition, corporate image, and 
routinized purchase behaviour, can be lost (Horsky and 
Swyngedouw, 1987). 
Hence, corporate rebranding can be distinguished 
from corporate branding as the former refers to a change 
between an initially formulated corporate brand and a 
new formulation (Merrilees and Miller, 2008). Muzellec 
and Lambkin (2006) define rebranding as the creation of 
a new name, term, symbol or design for an established 
brand, in order to create a differentiation in the mind of 
stakeholders and competitors. As a brand is composed 
of tangible and intangible elements, rebranding may 
consist of changing one or all of these elements along a 
continuum (Daly and Moloney, 2004): from minor 
improvements to the visual identity of the corporate 
brand (i.e., logos and slogans) defining an evolutionary 
rebranding, to major changes such as the creation of a 
new name, i.e. revolutionary rebranding (Daly and 
Moloney, 2004; Muzellec and Lambkin, 2006). Delattre 
(2002) divides corporate name changes into „level 1‟ 
changes (when reorganising the elements of a whole 
system that remains unchanged) and „level 2‟ changes 
(when the system is modified). We can consider these 
two levels as similar to the evolutionary/revolutionary 
continuum. 
Rebranding strategies are directly linked with brand 
equity management. Firms wanting to add value to their 
offer through corporate rebranding have to evaluate and 
manage their brand equity. One approach to assess the 
value of brand equity derives from finance theory and 
uses the stock price as the evaluation basis (Aaker, 
1991). The argument is that the stock market will adjust 
the price of a firm to reflect future prospects of its 
brands. Stakeholders‟ define their image of the firm 
based on the signals that emanate from it. Corporate 
rebranding is a very strong formal signal that 
stakeholders receive that something about the 
corporation has changed (Muzellec and Lambkin, 
2006). It is expected that these corporate rebranding 
actions will impact the corporate market value and thus 
constitute a signal that shareholders will use when they 
evaluate the firm. One mentioned disadvantage of 
working with the stock market relates to the need of 
events to be sufficiently large to be detected. Corporate 
rebranding exercises are considered major events and so 
noticeable. 
2.2. From Corporate Rebranding to Market value 
This financial market perspective derives from the 
„efficient markets‟ literature, that forecasts that in a 
well-functioning capital market, stock prices are the best 
available unbiased estimates of the value of the assets of 
a firm (Simon and Sullivan, 1993; Fama, 1970). It is 
preferable to use the financial market valuation than 
historic accounting measures that fail to incorporate the 
expected future returns of rebranding actions. 
Additionally, by using objective market based measures, 
comparisons over time and industries are possible. 
Dowling (2006) presents a framework linking corporate 




reputation to the creation of shareholder value, based on 
the four-part valuation model of Copeland, Koller and 
Murrin (2000). He claims that a good corporate 
reputation will be a part of the firm‟s intrinsic value 
which will be factored into the firm‟s share price. 
Einwiller and Will (2002) find evidence that a strong 
corporate brand and a favourable reputation contribute 
to higher stock prices. Successful corporate branding 
strategies will provide an opportunity for generating a 
significant future income stream (Schultz and de 
Chernatony, 2002), which, under the hypothesis of 
efficient markets, will be reflected on the stock price. 
A common approach to analyse this financial 
market perspective, i.e., the impact of corporate 
rebranding in market value, is provided by event study 
methodology. In marketing, event studies have been 
published across research streams linked to product, 
promotion and services (see Johnston (2007) for a 
metanalysis on the subject). Under the promotion 
research area, corporate name changes have been 
analysed by several researchers including Howe (1982), 
Horsky and Swyngedouw (1987), Bosch and Hirschey 
(1989), Simon and Sullivan (1993), Karpoff and 
Rankine (1994), Karbhari, Sori and Mohamad (2004), 
Kilic and Dursun (2006). Most of these studies find a 
non significant market reaction as a consequence of a 
corporate name change. One possible reason presented 
by Karpoff and Rankine (1994) is that those changes are 
anticipated by the market. However, Kilic and Dursun 
(2006) conclude that a name change has a positive 
impact on the firm‟s value. Horsky and Swyngedouw 
(1987) claim that name changes signal to the market that 
measures to improve the performance will be adopted 




In this paper, we aim to study the impact on firm 
value of corporate rebranding events, of Portuguese 
firms quoted in the Lisbon Stock Exchange (Euronext 
Lisbon). To that purpose, we consider all the rebranding 
events that occurred in the period from January 2000 to 
April 2010. The identification of the event dates results 
from an extensive research on the media and 
corresponds to the day of the public announcement of 
the corporate rebranding campaign. After controlling for 
confounding effects (contemporary events), such as 
dividend distribution announcements and capital 
increases, and for the lack of liquidity, we end up with a 
sample of 17 observations.  
 
4. Methodology 
The method chosen to analyse the impact of 
corporate rebranding on market value is event study 
methodology. This method measures the stock price 
reaction to the unanticipated announcement of an event. 
In our case, the event is the announcement of a 
corporate rebranding action. The event study 
methodology is based on the hypothesis of efficient 
markets (Fama, 1970). If stock prices reflect all the 
available information of firms, then when the market 
faces an event that is not anticipated, abnormal returns 
should happen with a positive or negative impact on 
stock prices. An appropriate event is an event likely to 
have a financial impact on the firm, providing new 
information that is unanticipated by the market and 
where there are no confounding effects (McWilliams 
and Siegel, 1997).  
We define the event day as the day when the new 
corporate brand is announced in the media. In a fully 
efficient market, we would expect that the impact on 
stock prices occurs either on the event day (day 0) or in 
the following day (day +1), if the information only 
became available after the market closing of the event 
day. In practice, it is normal to consider a larger set of 
days around the event window. We define the event 
window including days -5 to +5, relative to the event 
day. This allows for the possibility that the arrival of 
information to the market, about the corporate 
rebranding, has been leaked before the event day, which 
could lead to an effect on price occurring on the days 
before day 0. Also, allowing for the possibility of some 
market rigidities, or a lagged response by investors, we 
analyze price behaviour until day +5.  
It is important to note that the broadening of the 
event window to include more days has the 
disadvantage that prices, in that period, might be 
affected by confounding effects, including other 
significant announcements about the firm. Therefore, it 
is important to use an event window as narrow as 
possible, balancing the pros and cons of smaller and 
larger windows. As the event window of [-5; +5] is 
arbitrarily chosen, we also observe the behaviour of 
returns in two smaller windows [-2;+2] and [+1,+3], to 
confirm the robustness of our results.  
The appraisal of the event‟s impact requires 
measuring abnormal returns around the event day. The 
abnormal return is the return of the stock during the 
event window, deducted by the normal return of the 
firm, over the same period. The normal return is defined 
as the expected return if the event did not take place. 
Following MacKinlay (1997), we define for firm i and 
event date t, the abnormal return as: 






 tit XRE |  are the 
abnormal, actual and normal returns respectively for 
firm i in time period t. t
X
 is the conditioning 
information for the normal return model. We take the 
common approach of defining t
X
 as the market return, 
and thus we estimate the market model for each firm as: 
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 is the log return on the share price of 
firm i on day t, mt
R
 is the log return on the PSI 20 
stock market index on day t, i

 is the intercept term, 
i  is the systematic risk of stock i, and it

 is the error 
term with 
  0itE  . 
 From estimation of the above equation, we 
estimate the daily abnormal returns for the ith firm using 
the following equation: 





 are the ordinary least squares 





 over an estimation period preceding the 
event, including returns from the estimation window [-
150;-30]. The abnormal returns thus represent returns 
earned by the firm after adjustment for the “normal” 
expected return, which is determined by the market 
model. It is, therefore, the disturbance term of the 
market model calculated on the estimation window. 
Given the market model parameter estimates, we 
can measure and analyze the abnormal returns. Under 
the null hypothesis (no abnormal returns on the event 
window), conditional on the event window market 
returns, the abnormal returns will be jointly normally 
distributed with a zero conditional mean and conditional 






























 is the disturbance variance from (2), L 
is the number of daily returns in the estimation window, 
m̂ is the average market return in the estimation 
window of firm i, and 
2
m is the variance of market 































    (6) 
The second component of (4) is additional variance 




. Given that 
L=120 is sufficiently large, the second term is very 
close to zero, and so we take the approximation that the 




, and the 
abnormal return observations will become independent 
through time, as suggested by MacKinlay (1997).  
Under the null hypothesis, H0, that the corporate 
rebranding event has no impact on the behaviour of 
returns (mean or variance), the distributional properties 
of the abnormal returns can be used to draw inferences 
over any period within the event window. Under the 
null hypothesis, the distribution of the sample abnormal 
return of a given observation in the event window is: 
  itit ARNAR 2,0~     (7) 
The next step is the aggregation of the abnormal 
returns with the purpose of drawing overall inferences 
for the event window. The aggregation is performed 
through time (days in the event window) for each firm, 
and across firms. We define 
)5,5( CAR
 as the 
cumulative abnormal return in the event window, i.e., 
from day -5 to day +5, and is computed as the sum of 
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   (9) 
and so, the distribution of the cumulative abnormal 
return under H0 is  
   2.11,0~5,5
i
NCARi               (10) 
The final step involves aggregation across firms. 
For this aggregation, we assume that there is no 
overlapping of the event windows of the included 
securities, which implies that the abnormal returns and 
the cumulative abnormal returns will be independent 
across securities. Assuming independence, we aggregate 
through firms computing 
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and 














    (12) 
Inferences about the cumulative abnormal returns 
can be drawn using 
     5,5var,0~5,5  CARNCAR
    (13) 
to test the null hypothesis that the abnormal returns 




 is unknown, we use the sample 




 from the market model 




regression in the estimation window. Therefore, H0 can 
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which is asymptotic with respect to the number of 
securities N and to the length of the estimation window 
L. 
Alternatively, the individual securities‟ abnormal 
returns can be aggregated by  
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which we will use to analyze the abnormal returns in 
each of the t-days in the event window. 
 
5. Results 
Figure 1 and 2 depict the development of the 
average abnormal returns and cumulative average 
abnormal returns during the event window [-5, +5], 
respectively. We observe negative abnormal returns in 
days -5 and -4, followed by positive abnormal returns in 
days -3 to 0 and again, a decline in returns in the three 
days following the event, +1, +2 and +3. The 
cumulative average abnormal return in the 11 days 
included in the event window is positive, 0.412%.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Sample Average Abnormal Returns 
Notes: This figure shows the average abnormal return (AR) for the overall sample of 17 corporate rebranding announcements 
within the event window of 11 days. Day 0 is the day when the announcement of corporate rebranding was disclosed in the 
media. 
 






Figure 2 - Sample Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns 
Notes: This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal return (CAR) for the overall sample of 17 corporate rebranding 
announcements within the event window of 11 days. Day 0 is the day when the announcement of corporate rebranding was 
disclosed in the media. The cumulative average abnormal return in [-5, +5] is positive, 0.412%. 
 
In our statistical tests, we examine both in 
cumulative terms and individually, the abnormal returns 
in the 11 days included in the event window. For 
robustness, we also test a smaller window, [-2,+2], and 
given the observation of a negative impact on firm value 
on days +1, +2 and +3, we also study the aggregated 
results for these three days. These smaller event 
windows are more in line with the efficient market 
hypothesis, which implies that the stock price 
adjustment should occur very close to day 0. The event 
window [+1, +3] is consistent with the presumption that 
there are no leakages of information prior to the 
announcement in the media, and that there are some 
rigidities in the market, implying that the adjustment of 
the stock price to the news does not occur entirely on 
days 0 and +1, but also on days +2 and +3. 
Table 1 presents the results of our parametric tests, 
on the abnormal returns in each of the 11 days under 
study, and also for cumulative abnormal returns in event 
windows [-5,+5], [-2,+2] and [+1,+3] 
 
Table 1 - Sample Parametric Tests 
    Parametric 







-5 17 -0.145% -0.145% 0.822 
-4 17 -0.663% -0.809% 0.304 
-3 17 1.501% 0.693% 0.020 * 
-2 17 0.936% 1.629% 0.147 
-1 17 0.123% 1.752% 0.849 
0 17 0.150% 1.901% 0.816 
1 17 -0.610% 1.291% 0.344 
2 17 -0.499% 0.792% 0.439 
3 17 -0.626% 0.166% 0.331 
4 17 0.518% 0.684% 0.422 
5 17 -0.272% 0.412% 0.674 
[-5,+5] 187  0.412% 0.847 
[-2,+2] 85  0.099% 0.945 
[+1,+3] 51   -1.736% 0.120 
Notes: Daily average abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative 
average abnormal returns (CAR) for all the days in the event 
window, aggregated across the 17 firms. The p-values test if 
the average AR in each of the days of the event window  
[-5,+5] are different from zero. In the bottom lines of the table, 
we present CAR for three alternative event windows, [-5,+5], 
[-2,+2] and [+1,+3], and the respective p-values. 
* Null hypothesis rejection significant at the 5% level. ** 
Null hypothesis rejection significant at the 1% level. 
 




The table shows that the cumulative average 
abnormal returns in the event window [-5,+5] is 
positive, 0.412%, but not statistically different from 
zero. In the smaller event window [-2,+2], cumulative 
abnormal returns are very close to zero. The strongest 
positive average abnormal return is found on t=-3, 
which is significant at the 5% level. The null hypothesis 
is not rejected in any of the remaining days included in 
the event window. The global results for the window 
[+1,+3] are also not statistically different from zero. 
There are no abnormal returns in windows [-5, +5] 
and [-2,+2], but the negative CAR in window [+1,+3] is 
significant at the 5% level.  
Overall, our results do not allow rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no abnormal returns in the event window, 
and particularly, there is no evidence that the 
announcement of corporate rebranding has an 
immediate positive impact on firm value.  
6. Conclusions 
The event study methodology is a valuable 
approach to better understand and evaluate the 
performance of marketing strategies. This methodology, 
as Hozier and Schatzberg (2000) argue, contributes to 
solving the problem of integrating firm-level financial 
data with strategic marketing variables. 
 Our results are consistent with previous studies 
(Howe, 1982, Bosch and Hirsche, 1989, Karpoff and 
Rankine, 1994), which do not find evidence of a 
significant positive impact on firm value, resulting from 
corporate rebranding decisions. In our study, not only 
we do not find such a positive impact, but the evidence 
from the days after the event (weakly) points in the 
opposite direction, i.e., corporate rebranding strategies 
seem to be unfavourably viewed by investors. However, 
we do not find our results as necessarily implying this 
conclusion, as there are alternative explanations. Firstly, 
it is possible that the information on corporate 
rebranding decisions is frequently leaked to the market 
well before the official announcement, so that the 
impact on stock price may occur prior to day -5. 
Secondly, some studies have found that the Portuguese 
market has been less than fully efficient in the period 
under study (Borges, 2011), so it is possible that the 
“good” or “bad” news implicit in the corporate 
rebranding are not immediately incorporated in the 
stock price, nor in the five days following the event.   
The main limitation of our study is that we were 
able to identify only 17 events in the Portuguese market, 
in the period under study, which is a consequence of a 
narrow number of quoted firms in the Lisbon stock 
market, and may also reflect the postponing of 
rebranding decisions by firms, in the context of sluggish 
economic growth experienced by Portugal over the last 
decade. Nevertheless, the size of our sample is similar 
to other studies (Hozier and Schatzberg, 2000; Pruitt et 
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